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A large panel of German municipalities is employed in order to investigate the dynamic 
fiscal policy adjustment of local jurisdictions using a VEC model which explicitly takes 
account of the intertemporal budget constraint. The results confirm that a substantial part 
of adjustment takes place by offsetting changes in intergovernmental transfers, in 
particular, in ‘fiscal equalization’ transfers:  in present value terms about 34 cents of a 
one euro decrease in own revenue is compensated by subsequent changes in equalization 
transfers. The contribution of intergovernmental transfers to restoring fiscal balance, 
therefore, is about two to three times higher, compared to the case of US municipalities 
investigated by Buettner and Wildasin (2006). Nevertheless, budget components such as 
own revenues and general expenditures display larger fluctuations in the German case. 
This is consistent with the view that fiscal equalization transfers create a moral-hazard 
problem. 
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 1 Introduction
Aside from own revenues raised from local taxes and charges, local governments in most coun-
tries rely on intergovernmental revenue obtained from other governmental units, in particular from
higher levels of government. The literature on ¯scal federalism has justi¯ed this kind of intervention
as a means to induce the local governments to provide speci¯c types of public goods, to redistrib-
ute among lower level governments, and to ensure e±ciency under conditions of intergovernmental
externalities (e.g., Oates, 1972 and Gordon, 1983). The macroeconomic literature has also noted
that intergovernmental transfers play a role in smoothing spending and tax policy of local gov-
ernments in a setting with uncertainty and limited access to debt (e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Sachs,
1992 and von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). The more recent literature emphasizes, however,
that intergovernmental transfers give rise to important questions of governance, since higher level
governments allocate funds on the basis of conditions which to some extent are subject to strategic
choices of local governments (e.g., Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini, 2001, for a survey of the
recent literature, see Oates, 2005).
One of the major problems with intergovernmental revenue discussed in this respect is the softening
of the budget constraint with the consequence of possibly serious disincentives for ¯scal policy
(e.g., Wildasin, 1997, Qian and Roland, 1998). For instance, the possibility to elicit further grants
could lead local governments to incur de¯cits. If the central government cannot commit itself to
a strict no bail-out rule, subsequently revenue in terms of grants will rise and eventually restore
the ¯scal balance. As this example shows, the design of federal ¯scal relations faces a challenge
in providing ¯scal assistance without, however, responding too much to strategic local policies.
Another problem with ¯scal assistance is discussed in the context of interregional risk sharing: if
intergovernmental transfers provide some form of insurance against asymmetric shocks a moral-
hazard problem emerges in the sense that local governments pursue more risky policies (Persson
and Tabellini, 1996 and Bucovetsky, 1997).
In order to assess the importance of governance problems with intergovernmental grants, several
papers have studied exceptional cases, where lack of ¯scal discipline or some major shock has
actually resulted in a ¯scal crisis and a \bailing out" may be observed directly. For instance,
Gramlich (1976) discusses the case of the city of New York, Inman (1995) focuses on the case of
1Philadelphia, Seitz (1999) and Rodden (2003) are concerned with the cases of the German states of
Saarland and Bremen. Though this literature o®ers important insights into the workings of federal
¯scal institutions if local ¯nances have gone awry, the importance of governance problems is not
con¯ned to the rare cases of open ¯scal crises. Under conditions of soft budget-constraints and
moral hazard, the governance problems might simply show up in the local governments' ability to
elicit funds from upper level governments without necessarily undergoing a ¯scal crisis. In search
of the empirical relevance of soft-budget constraints and other governance problems, this suggests
broadening the viewpoint and asking whether and to what extent intergovernmental transfers can
be and are used to restore short-run and long-run ¯scal balance of local governments. In order to
address the governance problems, it would be particularly interesting to explore whether the role of
these transfers in restoring ¯scal balance di®ers among various institutional settings and whether
this has implications for local policies.
One important institutional dimension in this regard is the role of ¯scal equalization. While most
countries assist subnational governments by means of vertical grants, some federal countries, such
as Australia, Canada, Germany, or Switzerland, entertain horizontal redistributive transfer schemes
which aim at equalizing revenues across subnational governments. The corresponding equalization
transfers are usually formally related to the revenue capacity of the individual jurisdictions (see
Boadway, 2004, for an overview). However, little is known about the comparative performance of
systems with vertical grants and ¯scal equalization systems in restoring ¯scal balance and about
associated governance problems.
Against this background this paper sheds light on the role of intergovernmental transfers in restoring
¯scal balance using a large panel of German municipalities. It builds on a VAR approach by Bohn
(1991), which allows us to capture the dynamic adjustment to a ¯scal shock in terms of o®setting
changes in the components of the future primary surplus. Buettner and Wildasin (2006) have
recently applied this approach to a sample of US municipalities and have shown that a signi¯cant
fraction of revenue shocks is in fact o®set by grants from federal and state governments. This result
is remarkable given that US local governments enjoy a considerable degree of ¯scal autonomy.
While municipalities in Germany also enjoy some autonomy in expenditures as well as in taxation
they are subject to a comprehensive system of ¯scal equalization transfers. These transfers are
closely tied to the revenue capacity of the jurisdictions and might, therefore, be quite e®ective in
2providing ¯scal assistance in presence of revenue shocks. By contrast, the vertical grants received
by US cities often relate to speci¯c functions of government such as public welfare, education, or
public transport. Given those di®erences, the German case o®ers interesting comparisons with the
case of US municipalities. For example, do intergovernmental transfers play a more important role
in restoring ¯scal balance in the German case? If German municipalities enjoy more insurance from
¯scal transfers, is the time path of spending by German municipalities smoother than that of US
local governments? Or do we see some moral-hazard e®ects in the sense that German municipalities
engage in riskier projects?
The empirical results of this paper's analysis support an important role of ¯scal equalization for
budget balance. The degree of ¯scal assistance provided by intergovernmental revenue is much
more signi¯cant than in the US counterpart studied by Buettner and Wildasin (2006). At the same
time, however, we ¯nd rather strong °uctuations in expenditures and revenues, which relate to the
strong reliance of municipalities on the business tax. In fact, the results suggest that insurance
provided by the system of equalization transfers might induce the municipalities to rely much more
on the volatile business tax rather than using property or land taxes as the US counterparts.
The paper is set up as follows. The investigation approach is outlined in Section 2. Section
3 describes the data in greater detail and veri¯es that they are consistent with the modeling
approach. Section 4 present results of the empirical analysis for Germany and Section 5 o®ers some
comparisons with the US case. Section 6 provides the conclusions.
2 Empirical Representation of Fiscal Adjustment
In order to model the budgetary adjustment pattern in a comprehensive way without much prior
restrictions an investigation approach pioneered by Bohn (1991) rests on a vector error-correction
model which captures the development of budget components like revenues, expenditures, and debt
service as well as their interrelationship over time. To use an error-correction framework rather
than a simple autoregressive approach re°ects the intertemporal budget constraint: as the empirical
analysis deals with ¯scal policy ex post, the empirical approach rests on the stochastic implication of
the intertemporal budget constraint that budgetary components like expenditures, revenues, and
debt service display a co-integrating relationship, and, hence, the de¯cit needs to be stationary
3(e.g., Trehan and Walsh, 1988). Whereas Bohn (1991) is concerned with the analysis of the ¯scal
policy of the US federal government, Buettner and Wildasin (2006) study ¯scal adjustment in the
context of US local governments which obtain substantial amounts of revenue not only from own
sources like taxes, but from higher levels of government. As already pointed out in the introduction,
this revenue is of particular importance when it comes to assess the softness of local governments'
budget constraints and other governance problems.
While Buettner and Wildasin (2006) distinguish the primary surplus into three components com-
prising general government expenditures, own-source revenues, and grants, due to the importance
of ¯scal equalization in the German context the current paper extends their approach: it distin-
guishes (horizontal) intergovernmental transfers related to the system of ¯scal equalization from
other forms of (vertical) intergovernmental transfers referred to as grants. This helps us to discern
the speci¯c contribution of the two types of transfers in the adjustment towards ¯scal balance.
Formally, the analysis considers three components of the expenditure side of the budget, i.e. general
expenditures (Gt), current debt service (St), and ¯scal-equalization transfers (Tt), as well as two
components of the revenue side, i.e. own revenues (Rt) and grants (It). Whereas grants are strictly
non-negative, ¯scal-equalization transfers will be positive or negative depending on whether the
municipality is a net contributor or net receiver of transfers. Stacking these ¯ve components into
a vector
Yt = (Rt;Gt;It;Tt;St)0; (1)
the current de¯cit Dt is determined by a vector product
Dt ´ b0Yt where: b = (¡1;1;¡1;1;1)0: (2)
Following the literature, the empirical model assumes that the linear combination of the budgetary
components implied by the current de¯cit is stationary. Thus, the model describes the changes of
the elements of the vector Yt as a function of lagged changes of Yt as well as of the lagged de¯cit
A(L)¢Yt = ° b0Yt¡1 + ut; (3)
4where ¢ is the di®erence operator and A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. The lagged de¯cit
term captures the error-correction property of the system, implying that de¯cits or surpluses lead
to budgetary adjustments re°ected in ¢Yt.
The empirical estimate of system (3) can be used to trace the ¯scal adjustment to temporary
imbalances, i.e. to surpluses or de¯cits, which cannot be traced back statistically to previous
changes in the budget components. As usual in VAR analysis this adjustment can be depicted
by impulse-response functions. Actually, postulating a discount rate we can compute the present
value of the impulse-response of each variable with respect to shocks in every other variable. As is
shown in Buettner and Wildasin (2006), the presence of the intertemporal budget constraint implies
that the present value of the impulse-response functions (Bohn, 1991) will just o®set the triggering,
initial innovations. Thus, the present value of the future changes in the primary surplus should equal
unity for unit innovations in expenditures and minus unity for unit innovations in revenues. While
this is an implication of the budget constraint, it is not an exact empirical relationship. First of all,
the interest rate is generally not known with certainty, and it may also vary over time. In addition,
as discussed further below, the data display signi¯cant variation in the size of municipalities, which
requires scaling ¯scal variables in per-capita terms. As a consequence, the appropriate discount
rate is a function of both the interest rate as well as the rate of population growth (cf. Buettner
and Wildasin, 2006, for details). Finally, it should be noted that in the presence of assets Bt stands
for the net ¯scal debt position, which is di±cult to determine from available data. Nevertheless,
despite these quali¯cations, under reasonable assumptions the empirical results generally conform
with this implication of the intertemporal budget constraint, as we will see below.
The empirical model does not deal with ¯scal adjustments carried out before any de¯cit arises.
Instead, the model focuses on the adjustment to a change in any budget component which is not
immediately o®set in the same period by itself or any other budget component such that at the end
of the period a de¯cit or surplus results. In this context, it is important to note that the empirical
model captures the ¯scal adjustment to innovations regardless of their cause. To explore whether
the adjustment pattern is consistent with the actual responses to observed local shocks we add
some indicators of those shocks to the system and test whether and how these shocks are, in fact,
correlated with the forecast errors.
5Table 1: De¯nition of Fiscal Variables
Variable Description
(i) Own Revenues (Rt) local taxes excl. revenue sharing,
charges and user fees, ¯nes, pro¯ts,
other revenue incl. rents and royalties
(ii) General Expenditures (Gt) compensation of employees, pensions,
current expenses, subsidies,
investment, investment subsidies
(iii) Grants (It) grants excluding equalization grants,
including revenue sharing grants (income tax, VAT),
and reimbursements of welfare aid
(iv) Equalization Transfers (Tt) contributions to state ¯scal-equalization system,
county contribution,
net of state equalization grants
(v) Debt Service (DSt) interest payments,
net of interest revenue
(vi) De¯cit (Dt) (ii) + (iv) + (v) - (i) - (iii)
3 Data and Speci¯cation Testing
The empirical investigation employs annual data for the complete set of municipalities in a major
German state (Baden-WÄ urttemberg). After removing nine municipalities with data problems, the
sample consists of 1102 jurisdictions over a time period of 27 years from 1974 to 2000. In terms
of both the cross-sectional and the time-series dimension the dataset complements nicely with the
sample of 1270 US municipalities investigated by Buettner and Wildasin (2006) over a time period
of 26 years (1972 to 1997).
For the purposes of this study the budget of the municipalities is characterized by ¯ve ¯scal vari-
ables, constructed from the o±cial budget statistics which is adhering to a uniform mandatory
classi¯cation. Table 1 gives a rough description; details including the German designation and the
o±cial code in the classi¯cation plan are provided in the Appendix. There are two revenue variables,
own-source revenues and grants and three variables on the expenditure side: general expenditures,
(net) equalization transfers and (net) debt-service expenditures. Because the municipalities vary
in size, ¯scal variables are used in per-capita terms.
6Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Own Revenues .593 .261 -.117 5.90
General Expenditures .984 .327 .208 5.67
Grants .530 .205 .037 4.36
Equal.Transfers .057 .148 -.687 1.89
Debt Service (net) .030 .042 -.365 .434
De¯cit -.051 .216 -3.73 2.10
Population (in 1,000) 8.73 24.9 .093 617.
Employment per Capita .240 .152 .007 2.87
Unemployment Rate 5.56 1.91 .800 13.3
Neg. Business Tax Rev. .003 .058 0 1
Statistics for pooled observations. Figures refer to 1102 municipalities in the state of Baden-WÄ urttemberg in e1,000
per-capita and in prices of 2000. Fiscal variables and population are reported annually for the period 1974-2000,
¯gures for employment and unemployment are only available for the period 1980-2000.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The mean of in°ation adjusted per-capita expenditures
excluding debt service is e984. On the revenue side of the budget the largest component is own
revenues but also grants are quite important. Note that even though the mean of the equalization
transfers is positive, the minimum is negative re°ecting a municipality with low taxing capacity,
which is a net receiver of ¯scal-equalization transfers. The mean of the residual di®erence between
the ¯rst ¯ve components (equivalent to the de¯cit) is at minus e51 per capita, indicating that on
average the cities run a small surplus. However, there is marked variation in the sample. This
variation in budget outcomes is also re°ected in di®erences in the debt service, where some cities
show rather large interest expenses whereas others actually report net interest earnings.
Table 2 also provides statistics on some control variables which are used below in order to explore the
source of the ¯scal shocks. This includes local employment per capita and the local unemployment
rate. The analysis further employs a dummy variable capturing exceptional situations where the
local business tax revenue is negative. These are cases where, for instance, a major local company
went bankrupt such that tax prepayments have to be refunded, or where a major company has
appealed against a tax assessment at some date, won its case, and received a refund. Occasionally,
the total amount of refunds is larger than the current receipts. About 80 such events are reported
7in the dataset. Note that despite autonomy in setting the tax rate, tax collection is centralized at
the state level which also participates in the revenue; the local government has no in°uence on tax
administration including the determination of prepayments and refunds. Given the nature of these
events we use their occurrence as an indicator of a major revenue shock to the municipality.
The empirical literature dealing with aggregate budgetary revenue and spending data at the macro-
economic level has emphasized that the corresponding time series typically display non-stationarity
in the form of integration of order one. The basic system developed above takes account of this
possible form of non-stationarity of the individual budgetary components as it is formulated in
¯rst di®erences.4 Only the de¯cit is entered in levels, which is, however, stationary if the linear
relationship implied is a co-integrating relationship as the macroeconomics literature suggests. In
order to check whether the current de¯cit as well as the other variables employed are in fact sta-
tionary, unit-root testing is carried out using a procedure suggested by Im et al. (2002), which is
based on the full set of unit-root statistics for each of the individual municipalities. Because this
approach assumes independence of observations, the common component is removed by subtracting
the cross-sectional averages from each observation. Table 3 reports statistics for the ¯ve budgetary
components. Since individual cities show di®erent developments over the 27-year sample, it is ap-
propriate to assume a linear time trend in tests for variables in levels. However, the existence of
a trend in the de¯cit would con°ict with the intertemporal budget constraint. It turns out that
for the own-revenue series non-stationarity cannot be rejected, and the same is true for the other




























































































































































8Table 3: Panel Unit Root Tests
lag order (p) 4 5 6
Own Revenues -2.03? -1.98 -1.82
Gen. Expend. -2.15? -2.06? -1.89
Grants -2.09? -1.99 -1.88
Eq. Transfers -1.89 -1.85 -1.67
Debt Service -1.98 -1.95 -1.78
De¯cit -2.25? -2.15? -1.93?
¢ Own Revenues -2.30? -2.13? -1.89?
¢ Gen. Expend. -2.47? -2.27? -2.00?
¢ Grants -2.40? -2.15? -1.92?
¢ Eq. Transfers -2.29? -2.12? -1.83?
¢ Debt Service -2.14? -2.05? -1.85?
Average of augmented Dickey Fuller statistics. With the exception of the de¯cit, tests for variables in levels include
a linear trend. A star denotes signi¯cant rejection of non-stationarity at the 5 % level according to a standardization
using means and variances tabulated by Im et al. (2002, Table 3).
variables in tests based on higher-order serial autocorrelation.5 Non-stationarity can be rejected,
however, for the de¯cit, which supports the view of the de¯cit as a co-integrating relationship. As
the lower part of the table shows, non-stationarity can also be rejected for the ¯rst di®erences of all
of the ¯ve budgetary components. This supports the speci¯cation of budgetary adjustments along
the lines of the vector error-correction model.
The large cross-sectional dimension of the dataset enhances possibilities for empirical modeling
by pooling observations for individual cities. Typically, panel-data studies allow for individual
e®ects capturing di®erences in the characteristics of individual units.6 The following analysis deals
5Note that as in Buettner and Wildasin (2006) the optimal lag length according to the Akaike criterion di®ers
between individual municipalities, but in the majority of cases is not larger than 6.
6The literature on dynamic panel data has emphasized biasedness of standard panel data approaches in samples
with relatively short time series in the presence of lagged endogenous variables and suggests the use of instrumental
variable techniques (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al., 1991). But, with 27 years of observation in our sample, the Nickell
(1981) bias should not be a signi¯cant problem, and it is neglected in the tests for the presence of individual e®ects.
9Table 4: Speci¯cation Tests
lag length 3 4 5 6
indiv.e® (Â2 (5505)) 2507 2730 3064 3476
lag order reduction (Â2 (25)) 2445 1615 992.0 551.8
Likelihood ratio statistics on cross-equation restrictions.
essentially with ¯rst di®erences of ¯scal °ow variables; only the ¯scal de¯cit variable is entered
in levels. Thus, the presence of individual e®ects would imply that the jurisdictions converge to
di®erent (per-capita) de¯cit levels. If no indication of individual e®ects is found the set of regressors
is the same across equations. Then, it is appropriate to estimate individual equations of the system
(3) separately with OLS, because joint estimation does not improve e±ciency (Avery, 1977, and
Baltagi, 1995:103pp).
Estimation of the VECM (3) requires speci¯cation of the lag length of the model. Given the limited
overall time dimension of the dataset (27 years), we begin with a lag of 6 years in the di®erenced
data, subsequently testing for possible reductions in the number of lags. As shown in Table 4 a
reduction of the lag length is always rejected. This would suggest to employ a model with six
lags. But, since estimates of models with four and ¯ve lags did not show major di®erences in
the impulse-response functions the results presented in the following are obtained from the more
parsimonious speci¯cation with four lags.
Comparing estimation with and without individual e®ects it turns out that joint tests reject the
presence of ¯xed individual e®ects, regardless of lag length (see Table 4). As pointed out above,
this indicates that municipalities are commonly converging towards the same level of de¯cit in
per-capita terms and estimation can be carried out without individual e®ects.7
7Because innovations in budgetary components may share a common e®ect across jurisdictions one might also
think of employing time-speci¯c e®ects. But this would imply conditioning on common shocks and modeling only
adjustments to idiosyncratic innovations, although the intertemporal budget constraint requires adjustments to all
innovations.
10Table 5: De¯cit E®ects (Error-Correction Terms)
Equation ° (Std.err.)
Own Revenues :061 (.019)
Gen. Expend. ¡:453 (.021)
Grants :053 (.012)
Transfers ¡:080 (.005)
Debt Service :032 (.002)
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
4 Estimation Results
As is shown in Table 5 the results for the parameter vector ° of system (3) clearly con¯rm the
error-correction mechanism, since a higher de¯cit exerts a positive impact on own revenues and on
grants received, whereas it has a negative impact on general expenditures as well as on equalization
transfers. Note that equalization transfers are negative for municipalities with low revenue capacity;
the negative impact of the de¯cit, thus, implies that they receive more funds in subsequent periods.
The positive impact on debt service is consistent with the fact that the de¯cit results in a rise in debt
and thus creates higher debt service in the subsequent period. Given a constant rate of interest,
and in the absence of population growth, the coe±cient of the de¯cit in the debt-service equation
should re°ect the real interest rate and the ¯gure of around 0.03 seems broadly consistent with
this view. It is also interesting to note the substantial di®erences in the size of the error-correction
parameter. Whereas a higher de¯cit in the previous period by e1 shows a limited albeit signi¯cant
impact on current changes in own revenues by 6.1 cents the impact on general expenditures is larger
by a factor of 7 to 8.
As indicated above, the dynamic adjustment can be traced out using simulations in the fashion of
impulse-response functions. To provide an example, Figure 1 depicts the responses to an innovation
in own revenues. It shows that in the period following an exceptionally large amount of revenue,
revenue drops strongly suggesting that about half of the variation in own revenues is only temporary.
Nevertheless, some signi¯cant adjustment takes place in other components of the budget. First of
all, general expenditures start to grow consistent with a \tax and spend" sequence. In addition,












equalization transfers show a strong increase, in particular, in the second period after the revenue
shock. This re°ects a speci¯c detail of the ¯scal-equalization system: the taxing capacity, which is
decisive for ¯scal-equalization transfers, is actually calculated based on tax revenue (adjusted for
tax e®ort) two years ago.8
To obtain a comprehensive view of ¯scal adjustment it is instructive to calculate the total ¯scal re-
sponses in present-value terms. For this purpose, following Bohn (1991) and Buettner and Wildasin
(2006) the discount rate is ¯xed at 3%. The columns of Table 6 show the long-run impact of inno-
vations in per-capita values of the ¯scal variables, expressed in present-value terms.9 For instance,
the results in the ¯rst column show how ¯scal balance is maintained if there is an increase in own
revenue by one euro which results in a current de¯cit reduction (or in a surplus increase). According
8Cf. x6 of the Finanzausgleichgesetz (Fiscal Equalization Act) of the state of Baden-WÄ urttemberg.
9Standard errors are obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates and com-
puting the corresponding distribution in the impulse-response functions as suggested by Sims (1987) and Hamilton
(1994:337).
12Table 6: Implied Present Value Responses
Innovation to
Response Own Reven. Gen. Expen. Grants Eq. Transf. Debt Serv.
Own Revenues -0.569? (.021) 0.063 ? (.012) -0.040 ? (.011) -0.020 (.015) 0.185 ? (.055)
Gen. Expend. 0.274? (.019) -0.851 ? (.013) 0.355 ? (.018) -0.531 ? (.020) -0.991 ? (.082)
Grants -0.004 (.008) 0.028 ? (.008) -0.546 ? (.015) -0.057 ? (.014) -0.447 ? (.053)
Eq. Transfers 0.146? (.006) -0.047 ? (.004) 0.045 ? (.004) -0.530 ? (.008) 0.042 (.026)
Debt Service -0.029? (.002) 0.033 ? (.002) -0.023 ? (.002) 0.030 ? (.003) -0.323 ? (.019)
response to permanent change
Own Revenues 0.425? (.059) -0.088 ? (.024) 0.043 (.032) 0.273 ? (.081)
Gen. Expend. 0.634? (.023) 0.782 ? (.022) -1.129 ? (.046) -1.464 ? (.109)
Grants -0.009 (.017) 0.190 ? (.044) -0.121 ? (.031) -0.661 ? (.074)
Eq. Transfers 0.338? (.012) -0.314 ? (.046) 0.098 ? (.010) 0.062 (.038)
Debt Service -0.067? (.004) 0.224 ? (.028) -0.052 ? (.005) 0.064 ? (.006)
Standard errors in parentheses obtained by sampling from the normal joint distribution of the VECM estimates based
on a heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. A star denotes signi¯cance at the 5 %
level.
to the point estimates own revenues will decline in the future by 57 cents, general expenditures
will increase by 27 cents, and equalization transfers will increase by 15 cents { all in present value
terms.
Given the intertemporal budget constraint, the innovations in each of the budgetary components
should be fully balanced in the present value of future changes in the components of the primary
surplus. Summing across the ¯rst four rows in the ¯rst column of Table 6 we note that the present
values of the changes is o®setting as much as 99 (= 57 + 27 + 0 + 15) cents of a change in revenue
by one euro. Computing the present value of adjustments in the primary surplus to innovations in
general expenditures, grants, and equalization transfers yields similar ¯gures:
Unit innovation to Own Rev. Gen. Exp. Grants Equal.Tr. Debt Serv.
PV of change in prim. surplus -0.992 0.989 -0.986 0.984 0.687
Only for innovations in debt service the sum of the present value of changes in the primary surplus
di®ers from unity (in terms of absolute value). However, this result re°ects temporal °uctuations in
13the debt service. Because the point estimate for the present value of future changes in debt service
in response to a unit increase in debt service is -0.323, out of a unit innovation in debt service only
about .677 (= 1 ¡ 0:323) euros are permanent. Contrasting the latter ¯gure to the present value
of estimated changes in the primary surplus, the close conformity with the predictions from the
intertemporal budget constraint reappears. Given that the intertemporal budget constraint holds
only approximately in empirical data, as the true discount rate, its time path, and the amount of
non-interest bearing assets of the municipalities are not known, the close conformity of the empirical
results with these predictions is indicative of quite reasonable properties of the empirical model.
Generally, the results show that innovations to the components of the budget tend to be partly
o®set by future changes in the same component. This is particularly true for general expenditures,
where about 85 cents of the necessary adjustment in response to higher expenditures by one euro
comes from an o®setting change in the present value of future expenditures; as already noted
above, the corresponding ¯gure for own revenue is 57 cents. Since all budget components display
those °uctuations, albeit at a di®erent scale, it is instructive to re-scale responses such that the
¯gures report the response to a permanent unit innovation. In the lower panel Table 6 reports
corresponding ¯gures. Again, the results point to a key role of general expenditures in restoring
¯scal balance. Almost two thirds (63 cents) of the balancing adjustment to a permanent unit
change in own revenues comes from general expenditures. However, also equalization transfers
are important, making up a third (34 cents) of the necessary adjustment. Grants not related to
the ¯scal-equalization system show less response, in fact, the estimated response to a change in
own revenues is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The responses to innovations in expenditures
give a mixed picture: additional general expenditures tend to trigger an increase in grants, but
changes in other spending obligations such as equalization transfers and debt service are followed
by reductions in grants. The latter e®ects are possibly related to the role played by matching
grants: if transfer obligations and debt service are ¯nanced with cuts in general expenditures, the
amount of (matching) grants acquired possibly declines.
While the present values of the impulse-response function depict the adjustment to unpredicted
changes in the various budget components, it has been left open so far what the sources of those
unpredicted changes actually are. This limits our ability to interpret the empirical response as
an adjustment in local ¯scal policies, mainly, because a ¯scal shock might not just show up in
14Table 7: Signi¯cance of Conditioning Variables
Equations
Conditioning Variables Own Reven. Gen.Expend. Grants Eq.Transfers Debt Serv.
Period-speci¯c e®ects 309 (21)? 865(21)? 766(21)? 2987(21)? 584(21)?
Change in local employmenta 69.0 (1) ? 14.5 (1) ? 5.32 (1) ? 12.6 (1) ? 2.95 (1)
Change in local unemploymenta 1.14 (1) 2.03 (1) 0.69 (1) 1.20 (1) 5.31 (1) ?
Negative business tax rev. 105.4 (1) ? .260 (1) .452 (1) 1.89 (1) 2.05 (1)
Likelihood-ratio statistics for restricting the respective set of conditioning variables to zero.
a Period-speci¯c e®ects
included as further conditioning variables. Signi¯cance at the 5 % level is marked with a star, degrees of freedom in
parentheses.
one but in several budget components, simultaneously. To provide some insights into the possible
sources of the unpredicted changes, further information about the time-period, the conditions in
the local economy, and about speci¯c tax revenue shocks are included by means of additional
conditioning variables in our basic model. Their signi¯cance for each of the budget components
under consideration is reported by means of likelihood-ratio statistics in Table 7, which summarize
the gain in the predictive power from the inclusion of additional variables.10 The ¯rst row of Table
7 reports statistics for the inclusion of period-speci¯c e®ects. These e®ects capture all changes
in the conditions faced by all municipalities such as growth, unemployment, or ¯nancial market
conditions. A particularly strong e®ect is found for equalization transfers. This might indicate that
equalization transfers do not only provide ¯scal assistance and insurance against shocks but also
inject period speci¯c shocks into the local jurisdictions' budgets. The following rows reports results
where, in addition, some local indicator of possible ¯scal shocks is entered. While local employment
shows a much weaker predictive power it exerts signi¯cant e®ects simultaneously on several of the
budget components. Changes in local unemployment are mostly insigni¯cant and only exert a weak
impact on debt service. But as is evident from the last row, unusually large tax refunds which turn
the business tax revenue negative do qualify as a source of own-revenue shocks. The indicator used
10More precisely, the likelihood-ratio statistics indicate whether implicit restrictions in the basic, unconditional
model can be rejected on statistical grounds.
15to capture major shocks to the business tax is a dummy variable which is positive in the presence
of massive tax refunds rendering the (net) business tax revenues negative. As discussed above,
those cases take place, rarely, but occasionally, due to the speci¯cs of the business tax. While the
negative business tax revenue dummy has a rather strong predictive power for unpredicted revenue
shocks it does not exert any signi¯cant immediate impact on the other budget components. This
supports the interpretation of the impulse responses to an innovation in own revenues as dynamic
¯scal adjustment to a revenue shock.
5 US - German Comparison
Let us ¯nally compare the results with the ¯ndings for US municipalities by Buettner and Wildasin
(2006). Comparing the descriptive statistics given above with those for US municipalities reported
by Buettner and Wildasin (2006) we note ¯rst, that the fraction of general expenditures ¯nanced
with grants is 28 % in the US, but no less than 50 % in the German case. This suggests that own
revenues are much more important in the US case. One might object against this comparison that
the municipalities in the US investigated by Buettner and Wildasin show a much larger population
size with a mean of 75 thousand inhabitants, compared to 8.7 thousands in the German data.
But also when comparing small US municipalities with the German cities11 we still observe a
signi¯cantly lower share of grants in the US case (for small cities Buettner and Wildasin, 2006,
report a ¯gure of 26 %).
For convenience, the present value responses for the basic sample of US municipalities as well
as for small municipalities as presented in Buettner and Wildasin (2006) are displayed in Table
8. A ¯rst interesting di®erence is that the °uctuation of primary budget components, such as
own revenues and general expenditures, is lower in the case of the US: 35 cents of a one dollar
innovation in own revenues are balanced with o®setting changes in future revenue, and 72 cents out
of a unit innovation in general expenditures are o®set by future changes in expenditures (for small
municipalities: 42 and 70 cents, respectively). As noted above, the corresponding ¯gures for the
German municipalities are 57 and 85 cents, respectively. The stronger °uctuation in revenue likely
11The group of US municipalities categorized as small cities in Buettner and Wildasin (2006) consists of cities
between 1 and 15 thousand inhabitants.
16Table 8: Implied Present Value Responses for US Municipalities
Response Innovation to
Own Revenues Gen. Expend. Vert. Grants Debt Service
Own Revenues -.348 (.026) .162 (.019) -.144 (.023) .145 (.037)
Gen. Expend. .508 (.027) -.716 (.020) .338 (.027) -.370 (.037)
Vert. Grants -.086 (.012) .082 (.010) -.473 (.017) .049 (.016)
Debt Service -.005 (.005) .019 (.004) -.015 (.004) -.387 (.014)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenues .571 (.040) -.273 (.044) .236 (.059)
Gen. Expend. .780 (.021) .641 (.043) -.604 (.063)
Vert. Grants -.131 (.019) .287 (.033) .079 (.026)
Debt Service -.008 (.008) .068 (.014) -.028 (.008)
responses for small US cities
Own Revenues -.420 (.047) .204 (.040) -.188 (.049) .306 (.082)
Gen. Expend. .443 (.049) -.696 (.039) .262 (.051) -.319 (.084)
Vert. Grants -.075 (.023) .056 (.018) -.502 (.029) -.018 (.034)
Debt Service -.002 (.008) .015 (.006) -.012 (.007) -.337 (.027)
response to permanent increase
Own Revenues .673 (.070) -.378 (.097) .462 (.117)
Gen. Expend. .765 (.044) .525 (.094) -.482 (.129)
Vert. Grants -.130 (.040) .184 (.059) -.027 (.051)
Debt Service -.004 (.014) .050 (.020) -.025 (.014)
Source: Buettner and Wildasin, 2006.
re°ects the much lower importance of property taxes for the ¯nances of German municipalities
which, in contrast, rely much more on the rather unstable business income tax.12
Note that Buettner and Wildasin (2006) also tested whether the forecast errors can be assigned
to observed shocks and found that national trends in tax revenues are reasonable proximate de-
terminants of innovations in own revenues. This suggests that not only in the German but also
12In 2000 the revenue share of the business tax in own revenues is about 44.1 %. While there is no general property
tax, the share of the land tax is about 16.2 %. For comparison, according to the 1997 Census of Government US
municipalities report a share of corporation taxes in own source revenue of about 1.9% whereas the share of property
tax revenue is reported with 28.9%.
17in the US case the response to own revenue innovations can be interpreted as depicting the ¯scal
adjustment to revenue shocks. Therefore, it is most interesting to compare the ¯scal response to
revenue innovations, i.e. to compare the ¯rst columns in Tables 6 and 8.
This comparison o®ers some interesting di®erences: In the German case, equalization transfers play
an important role in the adjustment towards ¯scal balance: if own revenues temporarily decline
by 1 euro, equalization transfers decline by 15 cents in present value terms. In the US case, a one
dollar revenue shortfall would only trigger an increase in grants by about 9 cents in present value
terms. However, di®erences in revenue °uctuations obscure a direct comparison. But, focusing on
permanent changes in own revenues, we see that in the German case a much larger fraction of a
revenue change is compensated by o®setting equalization transfers. Whereas in the US case grants
rise only by about 13 cents in present value terms if revenues permanently decline by one dollar, in
the German case the contribution of ¯scal equalization to restoring ¯scal balance amounts to no less
than 34 cents. This shows that intergovernmental transfers do, in fact, play a more important role
in the German case in restoring ¯scal balance in the presence of temporary as well as permanent
revenue shocks.
The ¯ndings of a higher degree of °uctuations in primary budget components and of a larger
fraction of revenue changes compensated by o®setting equalization transfers might well be related,
however. While German municipalities do have a land tax at their disposal where they have the
autonomy to set the tax rate, they tend to rely heavily on the rather volatile business tax.13 US
municipalities which enjoy much less ¯scal assistance by intergovernmental revenue rely much more
on property taxes. While a thorough analysis of the choice of the revenue structure is beyond the
scope of the current paper, we may note that the empirical di®erences observed are, at least, in
accordance with theoretical concerns that the large degree of insurance provided by the system of
equalization grants results in a moral-hazard problem: the riskier local tax base might be adopted
partly because localities are insured against the revenue risks.
13The volatility of the business tax relates ¯rst of all to the volatility in pro¯ts. This volatility is ampli¯ed by the
existence of tax-allowances which make the business tax progressive. Revenue °uctuations also result from the fact
that the business tax is paid ex-ante, which results in frequent tax rebates and arrears.
186 Conclusions
This paper has developed an empirical model of the adjustment path towards ¯scal balance for Ger-
man municipalities. The model operates under a minimum of prior restrictions, such that, except
for the implications of the intertemporal budget constraint, no additional structure is imposed. Due
to the speci¯cs of the ¯scal institutions under which German municipalities operate the analysis
distinguishes not only general expenditures, own revenues, and debt service, but also two separate
components capturing intergovernmental transfers: grants and ¯scal-equalization transfers, where
the latter capture the net-transfer obligations to the ¯scal-equalization system. The results ob-
tained are consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint as the present value of all future
changes in the primary surplus calculated using a ¯xed discount rate is matching quite closely with
the initial disturbance of ¯scal balance regardless of which budget component is actually considered.
For all budget components temporary °uctuations are observed in the sense that current changes
in a component are o®set with future changes in the same variable. Thus, an increase in own
revenues is followed by a reduction, a decline in general expenditures is o®set by a future increase
etc. Focusing on permanent innovations, about two thirds of the adjustment is actually carried
out by changing general expenditures. But also equalization transfers play an important role in
restoring ¯scal balance: a third (34 cents) of the necessary adjustment takes place by o®setting
changes in equalizations transfers. In order to explore whether and how the unpredicted changes in
the budget components are associated with exogenous shocks we added various indicators of local
shocks to the system, capturing employment conditions as well as large tax refunds related with
the business tax. The results suggest that, at least, the empirical response to an innovation in own
revenues can be interpreted as revealing the dynamic ¯scal adjustment in response to a revenue
shock.
A comparison with the case of US municipalities investigated by Buettner and Wildasin (2006)
shows that intergovernmental transfers do, in fact, play a more important role in restoring ¯scal
balance in the German case in the presence of temporary as well as permanent revenue shocks.
Whereas in the US case investigated by Buettner and Wildasin (2006) intergovernmental transfers
rise only by about 13 cents in present value terms if revenue permanently declines by one dollar, in
the German case the contribution of intergovernmental transfers in restoring ¯scal balance is about
19two to three times higher.
Despite the large degree of insurance, however, budgetary °uctuations tend to be larger in Germany,
in particular own revenues and general expenditures are more volatile. Given that the German
municipalities rely heavily on a rather unstable business tax but do not show much tax e®ort with
regard to land taxation, these results point to a moral-hazard e®ect of ¯scal equalization: the larger
degree of ¯scal assistance provided by the system of equalization grants in Germany might induce
the municipalities to rely on the highly volatile business tax rather than to use property taxes as
the US municipalities.
20Appendix
A Data Sources and De¯nitions
The basic dataset consists of all 1111 municipalities (Gemeinden) of the state of Baden{WÄ urttem-
berg in the period from 1974 to 2000. 9 municipalities were removed because of data problems. With
the exception of the price index all data are obtained from the state's statistical o±ce (Statistisches
Landesamt).
Own revenues includes revenue from the business tax (net of transfers related to the business
tax revenue sharing with state and federal governments), revenues from land and other taxes,
exclusive of revenue from income taxes and sales taxes, as the latter are subject to a revenue
sharing system. In addition own revenues includes charges and user fees, ¯nes as well as rents
and royalties.
General expenditure include the compensation of employees including social security contribu-
tions as well as pensions, furthermore all current expenses excluding interest expenses and
contributions to the revenue sharing and ¯scal-equalization systems.
Grants comprise all sorts of unconditional and conditional or targeted grants including revenue
sharing grants but excluding grants related to the ¯scal-equalization system.
Equalization transfers consist of contributions to state ¯scal-equalization system, including
county contributions, net of state equalization grants received.
Debt service is de¯ned by the interest payments net of interest revenue.
Table 9 reports the German designation as well as the o±cial classi¯cation code.




+ Personalausgaben insgesamt 4
+ Ausg. sÄ achl.Verw.-u.Betr.Aufw.insg. 5/6
{ Ausg.Erst.Verw.-Btr.Ausg.inn.Ver. 679
{ A.Vw.Hh/Kalkulator.Kosten insg. 68
+ Ausg.Zuweis.u.ZuschÄ usse insg. 7
+ Ausgaben/Allgemeine Zuweisungen 82




+ Gemeindeanteil an der Einkommenst. 010
+ Gemeindeanteil an der Umsatzsteuer 012





+ Einn./Ersatz v.sozialen Leist.insg. 24/25
+ Einn.Zuweis.u.Zusch.f.Invest.insg. 36
Equalization Transfers
Ausgaben/Allgemeine Umlagen insg. 83
{ Einnahmen/SchlÄ usselzuweisungen 04
Debt Service
+ A.Vw.Hh/Zinsausgaben insgesamt 80
{ Zinseinnahmen insg. 20
+ Sonstige Ausg.Kreditbesch.kosten 990
Own Revenues
+ Realsteuern insg. 00
- Steuerbeteil.Gewerbesteuerumlage 810
+ Andere Steuern insg. 02
+ SteuerÄ ahnliche Einnahmen insg. 03
+ Einn./GebÄ uhr.Entgelte,Zwg.Abgab. 10/11/12
+ Einnahmen aus Verkauf 13
+ Einnahmen/Mieten und Pachten 14
+ Sonst.Verwalt.-u.Betriebseinnahm. 15
+ Gewinnant.v.Wirtsch.untern.Konz.abg. 21
+ Weitere Finanzeinnahmen insg. 26
+ Einn./BeitrÄ age u.Ä ahnliche Entgelte 35
Column (2) reports the German designations. Column (3) reports the corresponding o±cial classi¯cation code
(Gemeindehaushaltsverordnung fÄ ur Baden-WÄ urttemberg, Gruppierungsplan).
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